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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF urAH 








PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appeal from the judgnent of the Second 
District Court for Weber County 
Honorable Calvin Gould, Judge 
Case No. 14830 
OU1STF.AD, STINE AND CAMPBEIL 
Richard W. Caripbell 
L. Charles Evans 
520 Kearns Building 
2650 Washington Blvd. Salt Lake City, ur 84101 
Ogden, ur 84401 
Attomey for P.espondent Attorney for Appellant 
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L. Charles Evans 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
520 Keams Building 
Salt Lake City, ur 84101 
Telephone: 801-328-2553 
lli THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UWl 
AANOVER LlliITED, a * General Partnership, 
* Plaintiff and PETITION FOR REHE.ARING Appellant, * 
vs. * Case No. 14830 
DeANNA FIELDS, * 
Defendant and * Respondent. 
* 
CXJMES NOW the Plaintiff/Appellant and respectfully 
petitions the Court for a rehearing of the above matter after an 
adverse decision by this Court in favor of Defendant an 
September 1, 1977. 
DATED this _jk_ day of September, 1977. 
L. Charles Evans 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
ii 
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POINTS OF ERROR 
Plaintiff believes and therefore asserts that this 
Court erred in its September 1, 1977 decision in the following ways: 
1. In concluding that there was adequate evidence to 
support the concept of integration of the March Contract and the 
July Earnest funey Agreemmt wherein the March Contract was replaced 
by the latter. 
2. In not applying the doctrine of practical construction 
in construing the July Earnest Money Agreerrent. 
3. In concluding that the July Earnest funey Agreemmt 
was not ambiguous. 
4. In concluding that the M:l.rch Contract had failed. 
5. In concluding that Defendant had acted in good faith 
in regard to the July application for financing. 
iii 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF lJrAH 
lW~VER. Lil1ITED, a 
* General Partnership, 










BRIEF IN SUPPORl' OF 
PEITTION FOR REHF.ARING 
Case No. 14830 
On Septenber 1, 1977, this Court handed down a ruling 
affirming the l~r court's judgrrent in favor of the Defendant. In 
doing so, the Court rejected the "ratification" and "offset" arguments 
of Plaintiff as being considered for the first t:i.Ile on appeal and found 
sufficient evidence to support integration of the contractual doCUIEnts 
and to support Defendant's good faith in COIIplyingwith the terms of the 
cbcurrents. In finding error with the Court's ruling, Plaintiff will 
not consider the rulings of the "integration" and "offset" arguments, 
for there is sufficient authority to the contrary that reasonable minds 
mi.ght differ. With regard to the construction of the contracts and 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Defendant's good faith, however, Plaintiff finds the law and evidence 
strongly in support of Plaintiff's position and appeals to the Court 
once mre to consider Plaintiff's argurrEI1.ts in these regards. 
In its Opinion, the Court stated that a comprehensive 
review of the record disclosed adequate evidence to support the concep: 
of :integration as well as the finding of good faith compliance with th 
te:rm:i of the Agreement. In addition, the Court stated that the Earnes: 
M:m.ey Agreement was cornplete on its face and contained no ambiguities. 
The Court went on to say that, since prior to the execution of the 
Earnest t-bney Agreement the parties had not been able to obtain 
t..~e necessary financing to accornplish the sale, it appeared perfectly 
logical for the trial court to have found that, since the initial 
Contract had failed, the parties agreed upon a different contractual 
arrangement, which they substituted for the foruer. Plaintiff would 
like to examine the strength of each of these conclusions in light of 
the appropriate law and evidence. 
I 
THE MARCH UNIFORM .REAL ESTATE CONI'RACT WAS 001' REPI.ACED BY 
OR INI'EGRATED INl'O THE JULY EARNEST MJNEY AGREEMENI'. 
To properly examine the issue of integration, one nust have 
an adequate understanding of the purposes of the tbrch Uniform Real 
Estate Contract and of the July Earnest funey Agreement. The March 
Contract was a sinple, short-term vehicle which enabled the Defendant 
-2-
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to purchase her condominium. imlediately, while waiting to obtain 
long-tenn financing at a later date. Its purpose was to allow the 
Defendant to secure and oove into her condominium even though her 
initial loan application had failed. Her down paynent was used oostly 
to prepare the apartIIEnt so that she could mve in. The rest was used 
to pay sales conmi..ssion. (R. 107) . The contract was a ti.ma frame-
IDrk designed to enable Defendant to YiOrk out her long-term financing. 
During a period of 18 IIDnths, Defendant could make as many changes in 
her financial status and as many loan applications as she needed in 
order to obtain her financing. None of the applications, nor the 
Earnest M:mey Agreements acconpanying them, YiOuld have supplanted the 
March Contract, but YlOuld rather have operated within its boundaries. 
It was not bec;ause the March c.ontract failed that the July application 
for financing was made. To the contrary, the March Contract did not 
fail - - its purpose was to be fulfilled by such an application. 
Had the anticipated July loan application been able to be 
processed without a new Eamest M:mey Agreement, such YlOuld have been 
done. Tne bank, however, indicated that a new Eamest Mmey Agreement 
YlOuld be necessary since a new application was being made. Plaintiff 
thereupon prepared a new Earn.est M:mey AgreeIIEilt for the sole purpose 
of having the loan application processed. The Defendant testified twice 
at trial that she understood the purpose of the Eamest M:mey Agreement 
was to enable her to get a loan. (R. 140). This was no new schene. 
It was forseen and intended by the March Contract. Defendant admitted 
-3-
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at trial that there was no discussion with regard to the Earnest P.oney 
Agreerrent replacing the March Contract. (R. 140). That was never 
an expressed intention of the parties. That being the case, how 
did the trial court corre to the conclusion that the parties intended 
otherwise? The only evidence discernable to Plaintiff in possible 
support of Defendant's position is (1) Defendant's statenEnt on page 
140 of the record that she assured that such would be the effect of 
the new agreeI!El1t and (2) the July F.arnest M:mey Agreerrent, itself. 
II 
THE JULY EARNEST MJNEY AGRID1ENT WAS AMBIGUOUS BECAUSE OF THE 
lliCX>NSISTENI' ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AFI'ER ITS EXEClJrION, AND, 
WAS, THUS, SUBJECT 'ID THE OOCTRINE OF PRACTICAL CONSI'RIJCTION. 
As set out in the Utah cases of Bullfrog Marina, Inc. vs. 
Lentz, 501 P. 2nd 266, 28 Utah 2nd 261 (1972) , Bullough vs. Sims, 400 
P.2d 20, 16 Utah 2nd 304 (1965), and Zeese vs. Estate of Seigel, 534 
P.2d 85 (Utah, 1965), inconsistent actions on the part of the parties 
creates an an:biguity which then enables the court to look at the 
surrounding circumstances in determining the intentions of the parties. 
According to the court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. vs . Lentz, on page 271, 
the interpretation given by the parties themselves shown by their acts 
will be adopted by the court. "When parties place their own construc-
tion on their agreeirent and so perform, the court may consider this as 
persuasive evidence of what their true intention was. '' The court went 
on to say that although the doctrine of practical construction could 
-4-
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only be applied when the contract was ambiguous, such ambiguity 
could be created by the actions of the parties. 
''Where the parties have denxmstrated by their actions and 
performance that to them the contract rreant sonething quite 
different, the meaning and intent of the parties should 
be enforced. In such a situation, the parties, by their 
actions, have created the ambiguity to bring the rule 
into operation. If this were not the rule, the courts 
~uld be enforcing one contract when both parties have 
derronstrated that they rreant and intended the contract 
to be quite different." Bullfrog Marina v. Lentz, Ibid. 
It is the strong contention of the Plaintiff that the actions 
of both parties were clearly consistent with the ongoing validity of 
the March Contract and clearly contrary to the idea that the Earnest 
M:mey Agreerrent replaced the March Contract. The actions which 
support such a conclusion are as follows: 
1. No discussion was ever had between Plaintiff and 
Defendant to the effect that the March Contract was to be replaced by the 
Earnest M:mey Agreement. 
2. No mmtion was made in the July Eamest M:mey 
Agreerrent about its replacing the Harch Contract. 
3. Defendant continued to make paynents on the March 
Contract through October, three m:mths after the Eamest M:mey Agreemmt, 
and, in November, she promised to make further payirents. 
4. Defendant asked in October if Plaintiff ~d be 
willing to nndify the March Contract and even sat down with Plaintiff 
to negotiate such rrodifications. 
5. The idea that the March Contract was replaced by the 
-5-
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July agreement never sa:N light until February 17, 1976, when it 
surfaced in Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim. 
6. The express purpose of the Earnest Money Agreem:nt 
at the tine it was signed was to enable the loan application to be 
processed. If the loan could have been processed without the Earnest 
1-bney Agreement, it would never have been prepared. The Defendant 
understood this purpose and has so testified. (R. 140). The case at 
hand seem to fit squarely with the rulings of the Court in the ~ 
Bullough, and Zeese cases. The evidence seems so clearly consistent w. 
such a conclusion that Plaintiff finds it difficult to see how a diffe: 
conclusion could be reached except under som: unexpressed equitable 
doctrine which, if applied, should have been open to thorough exarninatic 
and argurent by the parties. 
The Defendant claims that the $1,000.00 loaned to the 
Defendant by Plaintiff and the application for a loan at the bank were 
ma.de on the validity and strength of the Earnest Money Agreement. That 
argurent, however, is not accurate. Many loans are made on the st:rengt 
of Unifo:cm Real Estate Contracts such as the one that Plaintiff and 
Defendant entered into in March. That Contract would have been used 
as the expressed basis of the loan in this case and submitted to the bi: 
had it not been for the fact that applications for these particular 
federal m:mies had to be accorrpanied by an Earnest Mmey Agreerrent. Th 
preparation of the Earnest Money Agreement, then, was ~rely a fonnalir 
to enable the application to proceed. The real basis for the loans 
was the t1arch Contract which the parties continued to look to and to 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
perform well after the July Eamest lbney Agreem:nt had been 
entered into. 
III 
DEFENDANT DID NaI' ACT rn GOOD FAITH rn REGARD TO HER JULY 
APPLICATION FDR FUNDING. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant testified at trial that the 
reason given them by the bank for the turn down by M. G. I. C. was 
insufficient square footage for the number of occupants in the i.mit. 
(R. 86, R. 143). The testinxm.y of the Plaintiff is that Zion's 
Bank, after an error was discovered, had agreed to resubmit the 
application to M.G. I.C. with the correct square footage. (R. 86). 
It was only when the bank learned that the Defendant was getting 
married within ten days that they decided that they r,.iould not 
resubmit the application representing Defendant as a single person. 
(R. 87, R. 193) . 
The Defendant briefly testified at trial that she had ma.de 
application for funding at the Bank of Utah, her own bank, after her 
ti.rm down by Zion's. (R. 148) . No written evidence of such application 
was submitted. Plaintiff queries whether such application, in whatever 
form it may have been, represented Defendant as a single~ or as 
a married r,.ioman, If as a single ~an. why didn't Defendant continue 
with her application at Zion's Bank? They only turned her down because 
of her marriage plans. If she applied as a married ~. there would 
-7-
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be obvious cause for a turn down because of a then clearly inade-
quate occupant -- square footage ratio. 
When Defendant entered into the March Contract, she did so 
as a single woman. In September, Defendant stated that she was going 
to remarry, although she now claims that she did not remarry. Should 
the Plaintiff be held responsible for a failure in financing brought 
about by the actions of Defendant, over which it had no control? 
This Court, in its Opinion, stated that the record was 
devoid of any holding back or unwillingness on Defendant' s part. 
Defendant's decision to remarry may not have constituted a holding bad. 
or unwillingness, but it certainly was the cause of the turn down by 
Zion's Bank and should fall within the reasoning of the court in 
Wineman vs. Guilnett, 60 Wash. 2nd 831, 367 P.2d 534, 535 (1962), in 
Ybi.ch the court stated that the purchaser was not entitled to recover 
his Earnest funey deposit where his own fault prevented the sale. 
-8-
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence and law both support Plaintiff's contentions 
that the March Real Estate Contract was never integrated into or 
replaced by the July Earnest 11Jney Agreement. The Judgrrent in favor 
of Defendant, therefore, should be set aside with direction that 
Plaintiff not be required to return Defendant's down pa~t. 
Alternately, assuming a finding that the July Earnest funey Agreemmt 
replaced the March Contract, Plaintiff should not have to return the 
down paynent because Defendant, herself, caused the financing to 
fail. Finally, in the alternative, the judgrrent should be reversed and 
remanded for new trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff/Appellant requests that this Court 
grant a rehearing of the above-entitled matter. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L. Charles Evans 
Attorney for Appellant 
520 Keams Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
